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LABOR AND THE SCHUMAN PLAN

Gerhard Behr*
European Coal and Steel Community of France, Germany,
Italy and the Low Countries/ in full operation since May 1953,2
is an unprecedented type of a supranational organization, unique in its
institutions as well as in its means for creating a single competitive
market for coal, iron and steel within the European territories of those
participating states.3
Aside from the long term political objective of Franco-German
rapprochement as the foundation stone for a future Western European
political consolidation or even federation, 4 the Schuman Plan encompasses economic as well as social aims. 5 By establishing such a supranational market the Community seeks to rationalize and modernize
the iron and steel production and lower their production cost, to expand
the production in response to the so stimulated demand, and to stabilize
and improve the working conditions in the heavy industry.
As a result of the new conception of the Community, the fundamental problems, whether political, economic or social, appear in a
new relation and perspective, meriting their thorough examination from
various aspects. The Community's institutional structure and economic
objectives have been discussed at some length elsewhere. The present
exposition endeavors to limit its scope to assessment of the Community
from the viewpoint of labor.
To meet in a satisfactory manner the demands of labor, afraid of
possible unemployment as a result of the common market and of the
re-establishment of another international cartel, and to enlist labor's

T

HE

"Visiting Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School.
1 For the English text of the Treaty, signed on April 28, 1951, see PREss AND lNFoRMATION DivxsroN OF THE FRENCH EMBASSY, TREATY CoNsTITaTING THE EtmoPEAN
CoAL AND STEEL CoMMUNITY, (hereinafter cited as TREATY) together with .ANNmois,
PROTOCOLS and the CoNVENTION CONTAINING TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS.
Because of the shortcomings of the English translation, frequent references will be
made to the original French text of the Treaty published in LA DocuMENTATION FRANCAISB, Nr. 1489 (June 6, 1951).
For a detailed discussion of the Community's institutional structure and economic
objectives, see Behr, "The European Coal and Steel Community: A Political and Legal
Innovation," 63 YALB L.J. 1 (1953).
2 2 JOURNAL OFFICII!L DI! LA COMMUNAUTI! EtmOPlll!NNI! DU CHAllllON BT DE
L'AcmR 112 (May 4, 1953).
3 Reuter, "La conception du pouvoir politique daru le Plan Schuman," 1 Rllvul!
FRANCAISE DB SCIBNCB PoLITIQUB 258 (1951).
4 Cf. the original proposal of Foreign Minister R. Schuman, 22 DBPT. OF STATI!
BuL., note, pp. 936-937 (1950).
Ii TREATY, art. 3.
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support for the Schuman Plan, the Treaty seeks to stabilize the labor
market and offer adequate protection against unemployment,6 increase
the wages up to. the highest wage level in the Community,7 and to
safeguard the labor interest:8 by granting a certain degree of participation in some of the bodies of the Community.
Although the labor force employed in the heavy industry is numerically rather weak (amounting approximately to 1,750,000, i.e., 10 percent of the labor force of the member states),9 its highly specialized
skill makes it undoubtedly vital for the modem industry. Its shortage
resulting either from inadequate vocational training, or low wages,
dangerous working conditions, obsolete technical equipment, inadequate housing,10 and not least of all, from fear of unemployment to
which the steel industry is particularly vulnerable,11 would seriously
jeopardize the entire economic system.
Recognizing the importance of coal and steel workers and their
problems, some individual states have already pursued a favorable social,
wage and labor policy. The nationalization of the French coal industry12 and the German law of co-determination authorizing the participation of the trade union representatives in the management of the
heavy industry,1 3 are examples of legislation enacted to improve largely
the position of labor.
However, its social progress stands a much better chance of being
accomplished in a wider economic area, rather than along the strict
6 Id., art. 2, ,i2, art. 56,
7 TREATY, art. 3(e).

and §23 of the CONVENTION.

s Id., art. 18.
Quoted from HIGH AUTHORITY, REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF THE COMMUNITY
58 (Jan. 10, 1953).
10 Id. at 97-99.
11 DAUGHERTY, DB CHAZBAu, STRATTON, THE EcoNoM:Ics OF THE lRoN .A?ID STBBL
lNI>usTRY 5, 32 (1937). See also UNITED NATIONS, EcoNoM:Ic CoMM:ISSION FOR EoROPB,
EUROPEAN STEEL TRENDS IN THE SETTING oF THE WoRLD MARxET 29, 73 (1949).
1 2 "Ordonnance portant !'institution des Houilleres Nationales du Nord et du Pas-deCalais," JoURNAL lliFICIBL 1876 (Dec. 14, 1944), 2079 (Dec. 25-27, 1944) and 402
(Jan. 28, 1945), SIREY, Lois ANNoTBES 1726 (1945). "Ordonnance modifiiant •.•
l'ordonnance du Dec. 13, 1944, Oct. 12, 1945," JOURNAL OFFICIBL 6471 (Oct. 13, 1945),
6814 (Oct. 23, 1945), 6897 (Oct. 25, 1945). "Loi relative a la nationalisation des
combustibiles mineraux," JoURNAL OFFICIEL 4272 (May 17, 1946), S1REY, LoIS ANNoTEEs
374 (1946). For further comments see Robson, "Nationalized Industries in Britain and
France," 44 AM. PoL. Scr. REv. 299 at 304 et seq. (1950); Pinkney, "The French
Experiment in Nationalization, 1944-1950," in EARL, ed., MoDERN FRANCE 354-367
(1951); J.C.B., "Nationalization in France," 2 WoRLD ToDAY (n.s.) 363 (1946).
13 BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Part I, 347 (1951). For further comments see "Employee
Representation in the Coal, Iron and Steel Industries of the Federal Republic of Germany,"
6 lNI>usTRY .A?ID LABOUR 137 (1951); Herschel, ''Employee Representation in the Federal
Republic of Germany," 64 INT. LAB. REv. 207 (1951); Weigert, "Co-determination in
Western Germany," 73 MoNTHLY LAB. REv. 649 (1951); P.S.J.C., "Managerial Revolution in Germany," 7 WoRLD ToDAY (n.s.) 249 at 257 (1951).
9
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and narrow national lines, which is particularly true with regard to the
maintenance of employment. Any failure to provide for social improvement would create not only a widespread dissatisfaction and
antagonism among labor, but also conditions likely to be exploited by
the Communists.
In view of the possible future alternatives, the framers of the plan
recognized the gravity of the problem and included the necessary social
improvement as one of the main objectives whose attainment could be
greatly facilitated by a common action within the proposed scheme.
Save for the hostility of the communist part:y1 4 and its labor organization,15 the plan aroused considerable interest among the Western
European trade unions.16 In view of the anticipated far-reaching
effects of the proposed Community on labor, the trade unions were, at
an early stage of discussion, invited to attend the constituting Conference and participate in drafting the Treaty. Thus labor became closely
associated not only with the formulation of pertinent Treaty provisions
dealing with wages and movement of labor, but also with the general
institutional set-up of the Community.

I
Social Objectives of the Community
The improvement of the living and working conditions of labor is
one of the fundamental objectives of the Community.17 Aside from
the general economic improvement and prosperity anticipated as a
result of a successful operation of the common market and likely to
benefit the producer, consumer and worker alike, the Treaty also tends
to promote the specific interests of labor by dealing with basic major
labor problems such as maintenance of employment, protection of
wages against exploitation, wage increase to the highest level in the
Community, labor safety and labor mobility.

Maintenance of Full Employment. As full employment depends
on the ability of maintaining a full capacity production of the coal and
1 4 EmAunr, DoMBNAcH, GARoscr, CoMMUNISM IN WESTERN Etm.oPE 42-50 (1951).
15 LoNDON TIMEs, June 20, 1950, p. 4: l; Billoux, "Le Plan Schuman de Guerre," 27
CAHIERS DU CoMMUNISMB 28-34 (July 1950); joint declaration of the French and German
communist controlled trade unions CoNFBDERAnoN GENERALE DU TRAVAIL (CGT) and
FREIER DEUTSCHER GBWERKSCHAFTSBUND (FDB), June 15, 1950, id., 91-94.
16 LoNDON TIMES, May 29, 1950, p. 6:5 and July 3, 1950, p. 6:5.
17TREATY, art. 3(e); Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, RAPPORT DB LA DBLBGAnON
FRANCAISE SUR LB TRAITE lNsnTUANT LA CoMMUNAUTE EUROPBBNNE DU CHARBON BT
DB L'Acmn (hereinafter cited as Rapport) 130 (1951).
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steel industries, any measure which attempts to stabilize the production level or minimize the effects of economic disturbances caused
either by decline in demand or scarcity of necessary raw material is at
the same time aiding labor in its struggle against the hazards of unemployment. The Community has a whole range of indirect measures
at its disposal for combatting production slumps. In addition to conducting a regular survey of the market conditions18 which might warn
of approaching economic crisis and afford adequate time for countermeasures, it assures a regular supply of raw material,1° regulates the
How of investments,20 and imposes quantitative import or export restrictions in times of declining demand or scarcity in the Community,21 as
the case may be. These are all measures intended to forestall dangerous
slumps and maintain full production of which labor ultimately benefits.
The notable social progress in protecting labor, however, is to be
found in measures which the Community is authorized to take, should
it be unable to maintain full employment. In case of unemployment,
the Community is concerned with the acute necessity of immediate
financial assistance to the workers released as well as with the long
term objective of finding and opening new productive activities either
in the coal and steel industry or, if absolutely necessary, in other
branches of industry, which would provide for them adequate productive employment.
The Community is authorized to grant the released workers nonreimbursable assistance, to be carried equally by the Community and
the state in question, in order to cover unemployment compensation for
those temporarily out of work, their re-installation expenses should
they move after employment in another region, and even expenses of
their retraining should there be a necessity of transferring those
workers to a new field of activity. 22
This assistance is particularly important in the transitional period
of 5-7 years23 during which the necessary organization of the common
market requiring the basic transformation of the national coal and steel
1 8 TREATY, art. 46, ,r3. For further comment see Pmou & RoBERTSON, EcoNOMIC
EssAYs AND ADDRESSES 38 (1931); UNITED NATIONS, EcoNoMic CoMMissroN FOR
EUROPE, EUROPEAN STEEL TRENDS IN THE SETTING oP THE WoRLD MARKET 73-76
(1949).
10 TREATY, art. 3(a).
20 Id., art. 54. The Community's cooperation with the participating governments in inHuencing general consumption, especially by projects of public services, as provided by art.
57 of the Treaty is another measure for stabilizing production.
,
21 Cf. articles 58(1),and 74; 59(5) of the TREATY.
22 TREATY, art. 56.
23 Section 1(4) of the CoNVENTION CONTAINING THE TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS;
RAPPORT 81.
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industries into one single economic unit may possibly cause some temporary unemployment. The readaptation of those industries through
modification of production, or even closing of some of the uneconomical
enterprises which, deprived of national trade protection are unable to
compete, will naturally affect labor, although it is protected by the
Treaty against the burden of readaptation through the Community's
financial assistance and assurance of suitable reemployment.24
Once the transitional period is over, however, the Community, as
to specific provisions with regard to labor, limits itself to questions
of technological unemployment only, i.e., an unemployment caused
by "the introduction of technical processes or new equipment" which
result in "an exceptional reduction in labour requirements" in the
heavy industry causing unusual difficulties in reemployment of the
workers released. 25
Although the conditions under which the Community aids the
amelioration of the unemployment situation are in this particular instance rigid, the form and extent, as well as the beneficiaries of the
assistance, are the same, i.e., non-reimbursable assistance for the
workers, and loans or their guarantees to enterprises for productive
projects within or outside the heavy industry. 26
Compared with the considerable concern over production, the
Community's authority over employment matters is weak and rudimentary indeed, for it recognizes and deals with only specific types
of unemployment brought about by technological development or
organization of the common market, ignoring and leaving aside possible unemployment originating in other causes (e.g., declining demand, lack of raw material).

Wages.

The authority over wages and social benefits of the coal
and steel workers has been practically left to the member states27 on
the ground that since wages are an integral part of the entire economic structure, an authority of the Community over wages of the
heavy industry would reach out to affect a large part of the whole
economy. On the other hand, it was recognized that wage policy and
24 CONVENTION §23(4, 5, 6).
25 TREATY, art. 56, ,II; RAPPORT, 125-126. Similarly, Hrna AaTHORITY, REPORT ON
THE SITUATION OF THB CoMMtINITY 94 (Jan. 10, 1953).
26 Since a High Authority's loan, or its guarantee, facilitating such productive projects
in other industrial branches than heavy industry is likely to affect the general economy of
the state, the Authority needs a concurring vote of the Council of Ministers. Cf. art. 56,
,I2(b) of the TREATY, and §§23(3, 8) of the CoNVBNTION.
27 TRllATY, art. 68, ,II; RAPPORT 132. See also Hallstein's remark in DER ScmIMANPLAN 17 (Frankfurter Universitatsreden, Heft No. 5, 1951).
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its wage level are factors too relevant in matters of competition to be
disregarded entirely in any effort attempting to establish a common,
competitive market. To this extent the Treaty considers the wage
level, relating it though almost exclusively to the conditions of competition only.28 The Treaty views the wage level in terms of its bearing
upon the conditions of competition.
The Community is authorized to intervene in matters of wages
and make binding recommendations,29 if it finds that the abnormally
low prices of coal or iron and steel products are the result of wages
fixed by an enterprise or government at a level which is far below
the general - wage level common within the region of a particular
member state. 30 It is to be noted that any consideration of wages is
prompted and conditioned by the existence of abnormally low prices
made possible by underpaying labor considered underpaid in accordance with the usual wage level in the region. The Community would,
however, be precluded from acting upon abnormally low wages if
this exploitation would not at the same time be accompanied by and
reflected in low prices as well. Should an enterprise maintain and
observe the average prices of coal and steel and grossly underpay its
workers, profiting thus even more, a strict interpretation of article
68(2) would prevent the Community from requesting a corresponding
remuneration for workers. 31
The anomaly of relating the Community's average price of coal
and steel products to the local wage level of the various regions is
justified by their different economic and physical conditions affecting
the general wage level of the region and the entire industry located
therein. 32 In order to appraise the wage-price relationship properly
and, furthermore, to avoid any disturbance of the general wage structure of the region, only the regional .wage level can serve as a useful
basis for this comparison.
.
The social concern for a proper wage policy is even more subordinated to the consideration of competition in article 68(3) ac28 RAPPORT 134.
29 As to the nature

of the various acts of the High Authority see TRBATY, art. 14.
Recommendations are such decisions of the Authority which though binding as to the
objectives to be attained leave the choice of appropriate means to the discretion of the
individual enterprise or member state.
30 TRBATY, art. 68(2).
31 However, in accordance with TREATY, art. 46, ,i2, which states that "enterprises,
workers, consumers and dealers, and their associations may present any suggestions or
observations to the High Authority on questions which concern them," the labor force could
call such a situation to the attention of the Authority.
32 RAPPORT 132.
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cording to which the Authority has power to intervene if an enterprise decreases wages, lowering the standard of living, in order to
carry out an economic adjustment or maintain its ability to compete.
Under such conditions the Authority may address binding recommendation to such an enterprise to assure to the workers "compensatory benefits."
The Community becomes concerned about the wage level only
on the conditions of the living standards decreased and of the competition affected. It would seem, however, that its insistence on granting
such compensatory benefits-a vague term which might include a
proper wage increase or decrease of working hours as well as increase
in social benefits-would spur such an enterprise to attain the ability
to compete either by improving or modifying the production, and to
become thus economically prosperous and healthy, a development
ultimately beneficial to the wage policy as well.
Certain exceptions to this rather static wage determination are
made necessary by the general development of the national economies
of the member states. Thus the Treaty considers a decrease in the
cost of living a permissible ground for lowering the wage scale accordingly33-a measure which evidently aims at maintaining the same
level of real wage34 under the changed conditions.
It would be equally inconceivable to block the member state in
its efforts to attain an external economic balance either by financial
and tax measures (such as devaluation or increased taxes) or by controlling and determining the wage policy, even though such allencompassing measures were to affect the wage level of the heavy
industry and lead to its decrease. 35 In this respect the state has a
free hand and, as long as a large part of the economy is under its
exclusive power, it cannot be otherwise.
Despite the professed objective of increased wages36 and the obligation of states and enterprises to inform the Community of any
notable wage decrease37 as well as of the Community's right to "gather
all information necessary to the appraisal of the possibilities of improving the living and working conditions of the labour force . . .
and of the risks which menace such living conditions,"38 the Treaty
33 TRBATY, art. 68(3)(c).
34 RAPPORT 134.
35 TREATY, art. 68(3a). See also sub-par. b and d.
135.

36 TREATY, art. 3(e).
37Jd., art. 68(4).
as Id., art. 46(5).

For further comment see

RAPPORT
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takes a rather cautious and reserved stand on the question of wages.
The Community lacks, at least formally, initiative for a constructive
wage and social policy.39
The aims of a general wage increase up to the highest level in
the Community is motivated partly by the social policy consideration
and partly by the desire to establish relatively equal conditions of
competition, to which a comparative wage equality is indispensable.40
This is, of course, an arduous task whose achievement is, first of all,
preconditioned by a precise determination of real wages (i.e., including all social benefits accrued to the workers) 41-a study presently undertaken by the High Authority. It might well be that at
the end this examination will come forward and disclose such a considerable wage discrepancy due to different economic, social, and tax
policies of the member states,42 that a relatively comparable wage level
could be assured only by a certain modification, if not unification, of
the existing social and tax legislation as well as of the economic policy
so far pursued.
Movement of Labor. To assure a rational use of labor within
the Community and to mitigate the dangers of employment, the Treaty
establishes a pool of coal and steel workers of proven qualification
and skill and nationals of one of the member states. Their movement over national boundaries will be free, subject only to common
health requirements and public order, the nature and extent of which
is to be agreed upon by the member states.43 To facilitate this movement further, the Treaty not only guarantees an absolute equality
of treatment as to wages and working conditions between a national
or immigrant worker and retainment of the claims to social benefits44
but also entrusts the Community to perform the function of an em39 Cf. the statement of the High Authority to the Commission of Social Affairs of the
Common Assembly, rejecting its request for Authority's initiative in social and wage policy.
Cf. CoMMUNAUTE EtmoPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'AcIER, AssEMl3LEE CoMMUNE,
RAPPORT PArr Au NOM DE LA COMMISSION DES APPAmES soCIALEs (Sess. Ord. 1953,
Doc. No. 3) p. 11.
40RAPPORT 130-131.
41 HrcH AUTHORITY, THE Acnvrrms OP THE EtmoPEAN CoMMUNITY, GENERAL
REPORT 105-106 (April 12, 1953). See also the already published report of the High
Authority, TAELEAU CoMPARATIP DES CoNDITIONs DE TRAVAIL DANS LES lNI>usTRIEs DE
LA CoMMUNAUTE (June 1953).
42 For this purpose, the High Authority established a Commission charged with the
study of the tax systems of the Participating States. Cf. 2 JoURNAL 0PPICIEL DE LA CoMMUNAUTE EunoPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER 33-35, arr~tes No. 1-53 and 2-53

(March 7, 1953).
43 TREATY, art.

69(1, 2).

44Jd., art. 69(4).
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ployment agency to assist the workers and the coal and steel enterprises of the Community alike. 45

II
Participation of Labor in the Community's Institutions
To evaluate properly the role of labor in the Community, the
participation of trade unions in its decision-making process must be
considered and, therefore, a short description of its institutional structure is necessary. The common, competitive market is to be organized,
maintained, and administered by the High Authority (the principal
organ and guardian of the Community's interests) composed of nine
members, 46 the powers of which are either absolutely independent
of the member states47 or shared with the Council of Ministers,48
the main organ of governmental control in the Community. 49 To
facilitate the function of the Authority and to afford an opportunity
to the interest groups to voice their opinion, a Consultative Committee
composed of fifty-one members equally divided among the representatives of producers, workers, consumers and dealers is attached
to the High Authority.50
Aside from the common decision-making process of the Authority
and the Council, whose concurrence is necessary for the Authority's
action where so prescribed by the Treaty, the safeguards against possible abuse of Community's powers is provided for by the Common
Assembly, a representative body of people of the member states in
general,51 and by the Court of the Community. 52
45

Cf. art. 69(2) of the Treaty, the last sentence stating: "They [the member states]

will also work out technical procedures to make it possible to bring together offers of and
demands for employment in the Community as a whole." For the activities so far undertaken see, HIGH AUTHORITY, THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 103-104
(1953).
46 TREATY, arts. 8 and 9.
4 7 Cf., for instance, TREATY, arts. 47 C,Jl), 49, 50(2), 54, 58(3), 59(6), 60(1, 2), 61,
62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68(2, 3), 86 (114).
48 Depending on the nature of the issue, the Authority needs for its action a concurring vote of the Council ranging from simple, absolute and qualified majority to unanimity.
The Council's simple majority is requested in following instances: TREATY, arts. 58(1),
59(5), 74(3), 56 (,rb) and CoNVENTION, §§23(3, 8). Consult also §§26(4), 29(1, 3)
of the CoNVENTION dealing with readaptation measures. A two-thirds majority is prescribed
by TREATY, arts. 50(2), 88 (113), 56 and also CONVENTION, §23(6). Council's unanimity
is requested by TREATY, arts. 54 (112), 58(3) and 59(6).
49 TREATY, art. 26.
50 Id., art. 18, ,rI. The Council of Ministers fixed the number of seats in the Consultative Committee at 51. Cf. 2 JoURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA CoMMUNAUTE Etrno.PEENNE
nu CHARBON ET DE L'Acmn 11-14 (Feb. 10, 1953).
51 TREATY, arts. 20-25.
52 Id., arts. 31-45.
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The extensive powers of the Community likely to affect the labor
force prompted the trade unions to press, during the drafting of the
Treaty, for their representation on and participation in the principal
organs of the Community, i.e., the Court and the High Authority.
While in the :6.rst instance the effort failed, as to the High Authority
at least an informal compromise was reached according to which one
seat on the Authority was reserved for a trade union representative.
Thus, the participation of labor in the administration of the Community is formally recognized only in the Consultative Committee.
Here membership is, however, equally shared by other interested
groups of producers, consumers, and dealers and controlled by the
Council of Ministers which has retained the right to determine the
representative trade organizations. The trade organizations are merely
entitled to draw up a list of candidates from which the Council may
make appointments.53
As a result of the merely advisory function of the Consultative
Committee, the participation of labor therein is of limited nature
also.54 Although the Committee's opinions are not binding, the
Authority is committed to consult with it and ascertain its views
53 Id., art. 18, paragraphs 2-4. The Council of Ministers determined the following
representative trade organizations: Germany: Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau, Bochum (2
seats); Industriegewerkschaft Metal!, Frankfurt/Main (2 seats); Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, Diisseldorf (I seat). Belgium: Centrale Nationale des Employes de Belgique (CSCB)
Bruxelles (I seat); Centrale des Metallurgistes de Belgique (FGTB) Bruxelles (I seat);
Centrale Chretienne des Metallurgistes · de Belgique (CSCB) Bruxelles (I seat). France:
Federation Nationale Force Ouvriere des Mineurs (CGTFC) Paris (I seat); Federation
Nationale des Syndicats Chretiens de Mineurs (CFI'C) Paris (1 seat); Federation des
Metaux (CFfC) Paris (I seat); Industrieverband Metal! in der Einheitsgewerkschaft der
Arbeiter und Angestellten des Saarlandes, Saarbriicken (1 seat). Italy: Federazione Italiana
Metalmeccanici (CISL) (1 seat); Federazione Italiana Metalmeccanici (UIL) (I seat).
Luxembourg: Federation Nationale des Ouvriers du Luxembourg, Esch/Alzette (I seat).
The Netherlands: Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond (CNV) (1 seat); Katholieke Arbeidersbeweging (KAB) (1 seat). Cf. 2 JoURNAL 0FFICDlL DE LA CoMMUNAU'l'E Euno.PEENNE DU CHARlloN E'l' DE L'ACDlR 12-13 (Feb. 10, 1953), giving also the names of
representatives chosen by the Council. See also 6 CHRoNIQUE DE PoLITIQUE ETRANGERE
64-68 (Jan. 1953).
54 Without drawing undue inferences, it is interesting to note that the labor representation in the ILO stands much more in the forefront in its operation than under the
Coal and Steel Community. There the labor participates-together with the representatives
of employers and governments-directly in the decision-making process of the General
Conference, the main organ of the ILO. Cf. art. 3(1, 5) of the Constitution of the ILO;
text reproduced in SoHN, CAsEs AND OnmR MATERIAL ON WoRLD LAw 1196 (1950).
It is, however, well to point to the essentially different purpose and powers of both organizations: while the ILO as a traditional intergovernmental international organization passes
to the member states merely recommendations in the literal sense, the acts of the European
Coal and Steel Community as expressions of supranational powers are directly binding on
individual enterprises as well as on the member states. Cf. art. 14 of the Treaty.
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whenever the Treaty specifically so prescribes.65 A failure to do so
would make the Authority's act deficient and subject to a review by
the Court on an appeal of the Council, member state or an individual
enterprise directly concerned.56
To facilitate the advisory function of the Committee, and at the
same time to provide an indirect protection of the various professional groups represented thereon and gain their confidence, the
Treaty further commits the Authority to inform the Committee of
all contemplated measures likely to affect them57-such as investment
policy or enforcement of anti-cartel and deconcentration provisions.
Thus the Authority's policy is made subject to public scrutiny.58
A unique feature of the Treaty is its attempt to assure a proper
labor representation even on the national level. In order to qualify
for a consultative status with the Authority in accordance with article
48 of the Treaty, the associations of producers seeking such a status
must admit the workers' and consumers' representatives to participate
in the leadership of those associations.59 Although this is a mere
statement of principle lacking any further elaboration of the criteria
to be applied, nevertheless, it may, if reasonably implemented by
the Authority, strengthen the participation of labor on the national
and, indirectly, even on the Community's level.

III
Safeguards
The representation of labor, either formal or informal, on the
various bodies of the Community is a general safeguard protecting
the overall interests of labor employed in the heavy industry.
In its everyday operation, the Authority will have to rely heavily
55 TREATY, art. 19, ,ii. The Authority is obliged to consult the Consultative Committee
for instance in TREATY, arts. 46 (14), 53, 55(2), 56, 58(1, 3), 59(1, 5, 6), 60(1, 2), 61
(11), 62, 67(2, 3), 68(2), 95(,rl); CoNVl!NTION §§24, 29(1, 2, 3). The obligatory
consultation of the Authority with the Consultative Committee is a fundamentally different
conception from that of the consultative status of non-governmental organizations "accredited" with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in accordance with art.
71 of the U.N. Charter. In this respect Krause's comparison in his "Betrachtungen iiber
die rechtiche Struktur der Europaischen Gemeinschaft fiir Kohle und Stahl" in RnCHTsl'ROBLEMB IN STAAT tJND KmCHE-FESTGABE PaER RunoLP SMBND 191 (1952) is
erroneous.
56 TREATY, art. 33.
57 TREATY, art. 19, 1[2.
58 RAJ'PORT, 53.
59 For further comment see RA!'PORT 54-55. See also CotINCIL 011 EURO.PE, CoNsaLTATrVE AssEMBLY, CoMMITrEE ON EcoNoMic QaEsTIONs, REPoRT ON THE EURO.PEAN
CoAL AND STEEL CoMMUNITY, DocaMENTs, 3rd Ord. sess., part I, 452 (1951).
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upon the cooperation of the associations of producers, workers, consumers and dealers which, together with the Consultative Committee,
constitute the main link between the Authority and the individual
enterprises and professional groups. To establish the broadest possible basis of cooperation, the Authority has the right to consult those
associations as well as individuals associated with them, 60 which, in
turn, have an equal right of submitting to the Authority their suggestions and observations,61 a right which might frequently function
as_ an informal preventive measure.
The requirement for a good and reliable administration of the
common competitive market and the necessity of an adequate individual protection need, however, more than mere consultation. For
that matter the Treaty grants to individual enterprises and trade unions
alike the right of appeal to the Court of the Community against the
validity of specific acts of the Authority which injure their interests.
Any trade union, or for that matter any other association enumerated by article 48 of the Treaty, is entitled to challenge the
validity of any individual act of the Authority even if it is not addressed to the association-as long as its interests are injured62 and
the act itself is deficient. 63 In accordance with the Treaty, a labor
association can contest an act of the Authority on the ground of its
legal incompetence (e.g., lowering of wages of the coal and steel
workers to which the Authority has no power), gross violations of
procedural or substantive provisions of the Treaty (e.g., Authority's
failure to consult the Consultative Committee where so prescribed),
60 TREATY, art. 46, ill. According to the General Report of the HIGH AuTHoRITY,
THE Acnvrrms OF THE EunoPBAN CoMMUNITY 19 (April 12, 1953), the Authority has,
up to April 1953, consulted "more than 500 persons-producers, workers, users and dealersin meetings with Committees or special working parties, as well as at meetings of the
Consultative Committee."
61 TREATY, art. 46, ,i2.
6 2 STEINDORFF, Dm NrCHTIGKEI'I'SKLAGE IN RECHT DER EunoPAEISCHEN GEMEINsCHAFT FUER KoHI.E UND STAHL 21-23, 26 (1952).
6 3 TREATY7 art. 33, ,il. The four types of legal deficiencies of the acts as set forth
by the Treaty correspond to the traditional classification of the French administrative law,
i.e., Z'incompetence, la violation formelle d'une regle de droit, le vice de f0r1ne, le
detournement de pouvoir. For further clarification consult W .ALINE, TRAI'I'E ELEMENTAIRE
DE DRorr ADMINisTRATIF, 6th ed., 134-145 (1951); Josse, ''Extension et limites des
competences du Conseil d'Etat SUI les actes, sur les jurisdictions, SUI les ordres," Ll!
CoNsEIL D'ETAT LivRE JtmILAIRE 164-166 (1952); RoHKAM AND PRATT, STunms IN
FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 32-56 (1947); Letoumeur and Hamson, "The Control of
Discretionary Executive Powers in France," 11 CAMB. L.J. 258 at 266-267 (1952);
Riesenfeld, ''The French System of Administrative Justice: A Model for America?" 18
BosT. Umv. L. REv. 400 at 424-429 (1938). For an exhaustive treatment of the appeal
for annulment as provided by the Treaty see STEINDORFF, Dm NrcH'I'IGKEI'I'SKLAGE IN
RECHT DER EuROPAmsCHEN GEMEINscHAFT FUER KoHLE UND STAHL (1952).
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or, finally, because of misapplication of power, i.e., use of power
granted but for other purposes than set forth by the Treaty64 (e.g.,
approval of an investment project and possible grant of loans for
futhering productive activities motivated not so much by the pursuance of the Community's objectives as by a partial intention to assist
a certain enterprise irrespective of the Community's interests).
Whether an interest was injured by an act addressed directly to
the labor organization or not would appear as irrelevant as whether
the act was, in its nature, an individual or general one. 65 In the first
instance, a narrow interpretation would deprive a labor organization
of the right to challenge an act of the Authority regulating in times
of declining demand the production rate of an enterprise or ordering
the separation of enterprises illegally concentrated contrary to article
66 of the Treaty, despite the possible harms to labor employed in
them. The protection of interests is certainly the primary purpose
of the appeal, and the kind of irregularity involved in the act of the
Authority should be considered of secondary importance.
A more complex issue is the extent of injury required to justify
an appeal. Technically, the Court will hardly be able to turn down
an appeal a priori on the ground of the appellant's failure to show
adequate extent of the interests injured. In practice, the determination of appellant's qualification will very frequently be possible only
after a thorough factual examination by the Court. Many an act of
the Authority will at least indirectly affect some enterprises and the
workers employed in them. Will, for instance, an injured interest
of a small number of miners be an adequate ground for a labor union's
appeal against the action taken? This consideration comes close to
the distinction of article 33 according to which professional associations may challenge individual acts of ·the Authority on any grounds
of legal deficiency, while a general act may be challenged only if a
6i Misapplication of power (detoumement de pouvoir) is a more precise term than
the general expression "abuse of power" actually including all four categories listed by
art. 33. For a detailed discussion of the conception of misapplication of power see W ALINI!,
TRAITB ELEMENTAil\E DB DnoIT ADMINISTRATIP, 6th ed., 142-145 (1951); Josse, "Extension et limites des competences du Conseil d'Etat SUI les actes, SUI les jurisdictions, SUI
les ordres," LB CoNsBIL D'ETAT, lJ:vRB Jmn::r..AIRB 165 (1952); RoHKAM AND PRATT,
Snroms IN FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 37-51 (1947); Riesenfeld, "The French System
of Administrative Justice: A Model for America?" 18 BoST. UNIV. L. RBv. 400 at 425
(1938); Vidal, ''L'Evolution du detoumement du pouvoir dans la jurisprudence administrative," 68 RBvtm DU DRoIT PtmLIC BT DB LA SCIBNcB PoLITIQUB BN FRANcB ET A
L'ETRANGER 275 (1952).
65 For criticism of art. 33, ,r2, L'Huillier, "Une conquete du droit administratif
francais: le contentiuex de la Communaute Europeenne du Charbon et de l'Acier," 14
RBcUBIL DA.LJ,oz; CmtoNIQUB 65 (April 2, 1953).
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misapplication of power is involved. However, this distinction between individual and general acts loses much of its validity and
meaning, because article 33 fails to require as a condition of appeal
that the individual act be addressed to the appellant in question. If
a party may appeal an act which is not even addressed to it, it would
seem equally reasonable to admit an appeal against a general act on
the broad grounds of an individual act as well.
In the absence of any practice and lack of Court's jurisprudence,
no definite answer can be offered, but it seems sound even here to
proceed liberally and with an adequate degree of B.exibility which
would afford a maximum protection.
A significant question is whether the enterprise or professional
associations have a right to claim some of the actions of the Authority
prescribed by the Treaty. Can, for instance, a labor association ascertain against the Community as a matter of right the maintenance
of employment or grant of unemployment assistance for its workers
released as a result of new technological development reducing the
labor requirement of the heavy industry? Although the Treaty does
not speak in terms of rights of the participants under the Community's
jurisdiction, yet the fact that some obligations and duties are imposed
on the Community in general, and the Authority in particular, assures
the enterprises and the professional associations of a right to claim
under specilic conditions certain action which, according to the Treaty,
the Authority is committed to take.
As interest can be injured by inaction as well by action, the labor
associations (and equally other professional associations and enterprises) are granted the right to bring to the attention of the Authority
its failure to make decisions or recommendations explicitly required by
the Treaty (e.g., failure to grant financial assistance to released workers
in accordance' with article 56), or actions which are merely within
the Authority's discretion, if such an omission constitutes a misapplication of power66 (e.g., refusal to finance new and productive activities motivated by the intention of the Authority to protect other
branches of industry). Should the Authority even then continue to
disregard its failure, such inaction is considered, after two months, an
implicit negative decision, against which an appeal to the Court is
permissible. 67
66 TREA.TY,

67 Jd.,

art. 35.
art. 35, f3. Cf. RAPPORT 36.
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Conclusion

It is evident that the Community pursues primarily economic aims,
dealing with social objectives as a secondary matter, which even in
its limited scope may be of considerable importance in the future.
The success of the Community, particularly the success of maintaining full employment and improving the living and working conditions of the workers would have a psychological effect whose political implications would be of no small consequence. It would
demonstrate the soundness of the new supranational institution as
a more proper means for attaining the widely sought economic and
social ends which would help to foster the confidence of labor in the
operation of the Community.
From the viewpoint of labor, the Community established in many
respects new labor relations, which put the worker in an unprecedented position toward his employer. The worker's supranational
protection against his employer as well as against the dangers of
unemployment, the supranational cooperation in the Consultative
Committee of trade unions among themselves and with the associations of producers as well, which protect the labor interest of the
entire Community-to name only a few and the most striking examples
-are entirely new features in labor relations.
In many respects, it is felt, the Treaty might have gone further:
it might, for instance, have granted the Community more initiative
in matters of social policy as for example in the case of wage policy
where powers over wages per se would have been perfectly justified
and feasible. Similarly, a broader grant of unemployment assistanc~
would have been appropriate.
As to the safeguards and remedies available to professional associations of article 48, directed exclusively against the acts of the
Authority only,68 the trade unions are in no position to challenge
the acts of their own states, even if they violate the provisions of the
Treaty specifically dealing with labor and are injuring their interests ..
This is a somewhat peculiar situation, particularly in view of the fact
that the Treaty is a part of the legal system of the member states
superseding in specific instances the provisions of their municipal
laws. However, at this stage of development it would have been
hardly acceptable to grant professional associations as well as enterprises the right to challenge the validity of such acts of member states,
68 Cf. TI!ru.TY,

art. 33, ,r2 with art. 38.
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a right which would conceivably strengthen the observation of the
Treaty.
This criticism does not intend to belittle the efforts made. The
novelty of the approach, by and large lacking adequate support of
experience, accounts for the cautious and reserved attitude which the
Treaty has shown on these and similar issues.
Should the Community prove to be a success it could not fail to
inspire further consolidation of Western Europe and promote the
formation of the proposed European political authority, 69 able to deal
with the economic and social problems more extensively than is presently possible within t:J.ie framework of the European Coal and Steel
Community. Such aims can, however, be achieved only on the condition that European integration ceases to be considered a mere temporary expediency and the unslackened efforts at it continue, undisturbed by any temptation held out by the changing course of Soviet
policy;
69 An Hoc AssEMBLY lNsTRuCTED To WoRK OUT A DRAFT TREATY SETTING UP A
EURO.PEAN POLITICAL CoMMUNITY, DRAFT TREATY EMBODYING THE STATUTE OF THE
EUROPEAN CoMMtINlTY, Doc. 15 R, adopted by the Ad Hoc Assembly in Strassbourg,
March 10, 1953, reprinted also in INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION, CONSTITUTIONAL AND
PARLIAMENTARY INFORMATION, 3d Series, No. 14, pp. 52-101. Cf. also CotINCIL OF
EUROPE, CONSULTATIVE AssEMBLY, INTRODUCTORY REPORT BY THE CoMMITTEE OF
JmusTs ON THE PROBLEM oF A EUROPEAN PouncAL CoMMUNITY, 4th Ord. Sess. [Doc.
SG (52)2, 1952].

